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**Blame and Protest**

*Abstract*: In recent years, philosophers have developed a novel conception of blame as a kind of moral protest. This Protest View of Blame faces doubts about its intelligibility: can we make sense of inner ‘protest’ in cases of unexpressed blame? It also faces doubts about its descriptive adequacy: does ‘protest’ capture what is distinctive in reactions of blame? I argue that the Protest View can successfully answer the first kind of doubt, but not the second. Cases of contemptful blame and unexpressed blame offer initial counterexamples to the view. The Protest View can accommodate these examples by appealing to a broader notion of protest, but, I argue, at the cost of retreating to a broader category that no longer captures what is distinctive about blame. Moreover, nonviolent resistance, in the tradition of Gandhi and Dr. King, characteristically protests without blame, presenting another powerful challenge to the Protest View. These challenges, I argue, undermine the view, while helping to illuminate and defend the appeal of nonviolent resistance. They also offer an alternative conception of the relation between protest and blame, characteristic of nonviolent resistance and obscured by the Protest View. On that alternative, the relation is not descriptive but practical; rather than understanding blame as a kind of protest, we should aim, in many cases, to replace blame with protest.

When protest leaders embrace nonviolence, they reject more than physical attacks. Mahatma Gandhi insisted that his method of resistance “excludes the use of violence in any shape or form, whether in thought, speech, or deed,” and “must not be the result of anger” (2001: 56 and 202; cf. 78, 201). Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. repeated Gandhi’s call that protesters avoid “internal violence” as well as physical violence, basing their resistance in “love seeking to preserve and create community”(2003: 18). Though blame is not always explicitly discussed in this context, its opposition to nonviolence can seem clear enough. Many activists and protesters—though by no means all—have thought it important to protest in a way that avoids a blaming attitude. As Dr. King (2010a: 50) put it: “The darkness of racial injustice will be dispelled only by the light of forgiving love.”[[1]](#footnote-1)

More recently, philosophers have suggested a different kind of connection between blame and protest. For these writers, blame is *itself* a kind of protest. We can call this view *The Protest View of Blame*, or simply: *The Protest View*.As Angela Smith (2013: 29) puts it: “To morally blame another…is to register in some significant way one’s moral protest of…[her] treatment of oneself or others”(29).[[2]](#footnote-2) According to Smith, protest is what “unites all of the behavioral and attitudinal responses we are inclined to categorize as blame”(29). Hieronymi (2001), Talbert (2012), and Pereboom (2013, 2017) hold closely related views. [[3]](#footnote-3) As Tognazzini and Coates (2016: §1.4) note, “Because of their relative newness to the scene, there is not much criticism of these views.” This is unfortunate. The Protest View is interesting in its own right; and it offers a fresh opportunity to reexamine some of the aims and methods of nonviolent resistance.

Those aims and methods do not explicitly conflict with the Protest View. It could be true, both that blame is a kind of protest, and that protests should generally avoid blame. But there are still three interrelated kinds of potential tension between advocates of the Protest View and advocates of nonviolent resistance. First, they may have conflicting conceptions of the nature of both protest and blame, some more charitable than others, with differences both in their central characteristics and in their details. Second, because protest is an important way to defend one’s values, the Protest View offers a way to defend the value of blame, while nonviolent resisters often doubt the value of blame. They might then conflict in their judgments about the appropriateness of blame in particular cases, or even in principle. Third, as I will argue, accepting the Protest View can obscure the very possibility of nonviolent resistance, by making it harder to recognize that protesting without blame is an option. In sum, nonviolent protesters and advocates of the Protest View can diverge in important ways in their descriptive characterizations, their values and choices, and even their understanding of their options. The Protest View has not yet been compared with the views of nonviolent resisters. But with all these points of tension, one can hope for a fruitful debate between these quite different ways of thinking about protest and blame.

In what follows, I have two main aims: to assess and ultimately reject the Protest View, and to use the Protest View to shed light on the value of nonviolent resistance. In §I, I consider the motivations for the Protest View and offer a partial defense of it, arguing that even unexpressed blame can be intelligibly described as a kind of protest. In §II, I argue that both contemptful blame and unexpressed blame can fail to protest wrongs, in ways that undermine the Protest View. In §III, I argue that, in many cases of nonviolent protest, the kind of reaction the Protest View has in mind is present, but not recognizable as blame. This further undermines the Protest View, while also helping to show how we might protest without blame. I conclude by suggesting a different picture of the relation between protest and blame, characteristic of nonviolent resistance and obscured by the Protest View. On that picture, the primary relation between blame and protest is not descriptive, but practical. Rather than understanding blame as a kind of protest, we should aim, in many cases, to replace blame with protest.

**I. Blame as Protest**

In assessing the Protest View, it will be helpful to focus on Angela Smith as its most direct and sophisticated defender. Smith “critically evaluate[s]”(2013: 28) influential recent conceptions of blame by Sher (2006) and Scanlon (2008). Despite their appeal, she finds them inadequate in describing the nature of blame. On her view, “there still seems to be something missing from Scanlon’s account, and I submit that it is the same thing that is missing from Sher’s account: namely, the element of moral protest”(2013: 38). Smith (2013: 43) defends a modified version of Scanlon’s view, which she calls

*The Moral Protest Account*:To *blame* another is to judge that she is blameworthy (i.e., to judge that she has attitudes that impair her relations with others) and to modify one own’s attitudes, intentions, and expectations toward that person as a way of *protesting* (i.e. registering and challenging) the moral claim implicit in her conduct, where such protest seeks some kind of moral acknowledgement on the part of the blameworthy agent and/or on the part of others in the moral community.

To illustrate this view, imagine that a close friend misses your birthday party, without good reason. If you are especially forgiving, you might still not blame her. But if you do blame her, in what would your blame consist? According to Smith, you would be judging that her attitudes impair her relationship with others, and, we might think, especially with you[[4]](#footnote-4); you would see, in her conduct, an implicit moral claim—perhaps, a claim that you do not deserve the care or respect that other friends deserve; and you would respond in a way that protests that claim. You might decide to call and ask her: “How could you miss my party?” But this is not essential. You could resent her privately, or seek acknowledgment of the wrong from other friends or family. Blaming reactions vary widely, though, for Smith, they have in common the basic features described by the Moral Protest Account, and especially the element of protest.

In treating blame as “a way of *protesting*,” Smith offers a way to capture two thoughts about blame. First, blame is often thought to be in some important way *communicative*. Though blame can sometimes remain unexpressed, it is natural to think that blaming is closely connected to addressing someone—paradigmatically, by publicly holding someone to a norm or standard.[[5]](#footnote-5) Second, blame seems importantly connected to *resistance*. To blame someone for an insult is, it seems, to in some way resist the claim made by that insult. The Protest View combines these two thoughts. On the Protest View, we might say, blaming communicates resistance. The chance to explain blame’s connection to both communication and resistance is a powerful motivation for the Protest View.

Smith describes several other advantages of her version of the Protest View. “First, this account gives a clear explanation of how blaming someone goes beyond simply judging her to be blameworthy”(Smith 2013: 43). Blaming, for Smith, includes a judgment that someone is blameworthy, but does more than make such a judgment. Blaming modifies one’s attitudes, intentions, and expectations as a way of protestingthe moral claim implicit in someone’s conduct.

Second, Smith thinks, “this account allows for the possibility of unexpressed blame.”(Smith 2013: 44). We can blame privately through a range of attitudes, intentions, and expectations, including feeling resentment or indignation, which “are ways of emotionally protesting the ill treatment of oneself or others”(2013: 44). On Smith’s view, we can blame even people who are distant or dead in these ways. We can also blame them publicly, by seeking acknowledgement on the part of others in our moral community who do interact with us.

Third, and relatedly, Smith thinks, her view includes an appropriately wide range of responses. Both emotional responses and “dispassionate” changes in attitude can count as blame, since blaming encompasses a wide variety of reactions. We can also see why the kind of blame that would be appropriate would vary depending on the nature of one’s relationship with the blamed party; a betrayed lover, a friend, and a stranger would have different attitudes, intentions, and expectations to begin with, and would rightly challenge the moral claim implicit in her conduct in different ways. On the other hand, Smith (2013: 46) thinks, “the moral protest account does not seem to allow ‘false positives’,…in which the basic conditions of blame are met but we are disinclined to classify the resulting reactions as instances of blame.” A mother who is sad about her son’s behavior, for example, would not count as blaming him, if she does not protest.[[6]](#footnote-6)

Lastly, and “most important” for Smith, her conception of blame “makes clear why it is a response that it is appropriate to direct only at individuals we regard as morally responsible for their conduct”(2013: 46). To protest the moral claim implicit in someone’s conduct is to treat her as a being who makes moral claims, and who can rightly be challenged. Here, Smith suggests, we can also say why we naturally react to blame with apology, and to apology with forgiveness. “In apology, the wrongdoer acknowledges and repudiates the…moral claim implicit in her conduct”(Smith 2013: 46). Forgiveness withdraws the protest, which is appropriate when there is no claim left to protest.

A series of doubts can be raised at this point. Is the Protest View correct, in Smith’s version or in any other? Does the view even make sense? Protest, in the ordinary sense, is an observable communicative act. Blame is often thought to be not an action at all, but a kind of emotion, evaluation, or other attitude, which may or may not be expressed to others.[[7]](#footnote-7) What could inner ‘protesting’ be in cases of unexpressed blame? Does it make quiet chants and carry tiny picket signs? The notion of unexpressed protest can seem deeply unintelligible. And even if it is intelligible, Smith’s view may seem not to describe all and only reactions of blame.

The doubt about intelligibility threatens the first two of Smith’s advantages: the view’s ability to give a clear explanation of how blaming goes beyond judging blameworthy, and the inclusion of unexpressed blame. The doubt about descriptive adequacy threatens the third advantage, by doubting that she has captured the variety of blaming reactions. The fourth advantage, of explaining a limitation to those who are morally responsible, is lost if the view is unintelligible. If Smith’s view is intelligible but descriptively inadequate, she might still succeed in describing a reaction that is appropriate only to the morally responsible; but the reaction will be a different one than blame.

It is natural to wonder what inner protest could be. But I think the real problem for the Protest View is descriptive adequacy, not intelligibility. In the rest of this section, I will explain why the notion of inner protest does make sense. This explanation is needed to present the Protest View clearly and charitably, and to bring out the importance of concerns about descriptive adequacy. With the central notion of protest more clearly in view, I turn in §II to descriptive adequacy, arguing that the notion of moral protest does not capture what we ordinarily think of as blame.

Intuitively, it seems, a protest is a statement or action that expresses an objection and demands a change. A letter of protest can object to a new law, and ask that it be repealed. In a public demonstration or rally, protesters object insistently to some action, policy, or practice. They make repeated chants, such as: “Hey hey, ho ho, fossil fuels have got to go.” They hold up signs that object to policies or their underlying claims either explicitly, as in “No more war,” or implicitly; “Fight like a girl” empowers girls and women, and also implicitly objects to the suggestion that girls cannot fight as well as boys can. Smith seems to be right that these messages are directed both to their immediate target and to a wider moral community. Signs or chants of “Black lives matter,” “Immigrants are welcome here,” or “Fight like a girl” can at the same time object to those who disagree, convey a message of value or welcome to those who are targeted, and affirm their message to society at large. Protests often combine statements with actions, as a rally, a boycott, or resigning in protest might do. But they can also be entirely non-verbal, as when an anti-war or gun control group stages a “die-in,” simulating death in front of a government building or gun store. On the other hand, all of these seem to be repeated, insistent, and/or dramatic *expressions* of objection. It is hard to deny that we sometimes blame without expressing our blame; and if blame is protest, unexpressed blame is unexpressed protest. What could unexpressed protest be?

As we saw, Smith accepts the need to account for unexpressed blame, including blame of people who are far away or dead. She writes (2013: 44):

Resentment and indignation, in my view, are ways of emotionally protesting the ill treatment of oneself or others. But we can also protest ill treatment privately through the modification of other attitudes, intentions, and expectations. Even if we are not in a position (for whatever reason) to make these attitudinal modifications known, I believe these reactions embody, at a deep level, both moral protest and a desire that the wrongdoer morally acknowledge his wrongdoing. Blame is *incipiently* communicative both in the sense that it registers (i.e., communicates, even if only to the victim herself) the existence of unjustified wrongdoing and in the sense that it seeks some sort of moral recognition of wrongdoing on the part of the blameworthy agent.

These additions can seem unhelpful. That emotions, intentions, or expectations can be a form of protest can seem no more intelligible than the thought that blame can. Even if blame’s ‘registering’ a wrong is communication with oneself, this is not clearly a kind of protest. And since blame can be unexpressed, it need not actually seek any recognition from anyone. The same difficulty remains: if emotions and other attitudes can be unexpressed, and protest cannot, how can they be a form of protest?

This objection, and the puzzlement it expresses, can be divided into two components. First, one can wonder how an unexpressed reaction can be *communicative* at all. Second, one can wonder how that reaction can be communicative in the particular way in which moral protest is communicative. We can take these in turn.

On Smith’s view, “blame really is, as many philosophers have argued, implicitly or incipiently *communicative* in nature. While it may not *in fact* ever be communicated to another, blame by its nature has an expressive point and a broadly communicative aim: it expresses protest, and…it implicitly seeks some kind of moral reply”(2013: 39). How can blame express *anything*, or seek a reply, when we keep our blame private, expressing nothing?

To answer this question, it helps to look to some recent writing on unexpressed attitudes. Macnamara (2015a, 2015b) distinguishes “the activity of communicating—something that mental states kept private undeniably are not—and the idea of a communicative entity”(2015b: 217). An unsent email, or a “No Trespassing” sign that has not yet been put up, are communicative entities, before any activity of communicating takes place. As Macnamara (2015a: 548) puts it, they “have representational content and the function of evoking uptake of this content in a recipient.” The sign “represents passersby as respecting the borders of my lawn”(2015a: 554), and functions to bring those passersby to understand its content and respond to it by staying off the property. Like hammers and coffeemakers, the email and the sign need additional human help to fulfill their function (555n15). But they have their content, and their function, before they are put to use. They are communicative entities—messages—whether or not the message is sent.

This analogy does not show that unexpressed blame, as Smith describes it, is essentially communicative. But it does suggest that the thought is intelligible. There is nothing incoherent in the concept of an unsent email; and there is nothing odd in describing such an email as ‘communicative’ in nature. If this is all that puzzles us about unexpressed protest, the analogy should resolve our puzzlement. After all, emails can themselves protest. An unsent email can be an unexpressed protest. If blame “seeks…moral acknowledgement on the part of the blameworthy agent and/or…others in the moral community”(Smith 2013: 43), blame can be compared to “an *open* letter…addressed to a person but for the general public to see”(Macnamara 2015b: 226).[[8]](#footnote-8) It is like a protest email cc’ed to friends or to a listserv. The email may be waiting to go out, or it may never be sent, but it will always be inherently communicative. We can even say, as Smith does of blame, that the email “expresses protest, and…seeks some kind of moral reply”(2013: 39), even when the email is unsent.

Is there a more specific doubt about the intelligibility of ‘inner protest’, apart from doubts about unexpressed communication? An unsent communication, such as an email, can have any content whatsoever, including a protest against any moral claim. But one can still be puzzled. Smith’s Moral Protest Account treats blaming someone as “a way of *protesting* (i.e. registering and challenging) the moral claim implicit in her conduct”(2013: 43). Her emphasis on protest*ing* suggests that she has in mind some kind of mental activity, rather than merely a communicative entity such as a message of protest. Modifying one’s attitudes, intentions, and expectations is a mental activity. And in considering unexpressed blame, Smith adds the caveat that it “communicates, even if only to the victim herself”(2013: 44). If Smith had in mind a communicative entity, rather than an activity, she would have no reason to add this caveat. She could say that unexpressed blame always communicates to the person blamed, in the sense of being a kind of message or address to her, even when unexpressed. In treating moral protest as sometimes reaching only the victim, Smith seems to treat it as what Macnamara (2015b: 217) calls an “activity of communicating—something that mental states kept private undeniably are not.” These descriptions fit well with the ordinary conception of protest as an activity. But they again threaten to make ‘inner protest’ unintelligible. It may be easy to accept that there can be unexpressed mental activity, in the way in which changing one’s attitudes is a mental activity. But it is hard to see how there can be a *private activity of communicating*. How can we communicate without expressing anything?

One possibility, suggested by Smith’s caveat, is that we can communicate with ourselves. Boxill (1976) argues, following W.E.B. Du Bois, that protest plays an important role in maintaining self-respect. Talbert (2012: 106-7) applies this view to blame: “I suggest that blame may also take the form of Duboisian protest—protest that does not aim at convincing others of one’s moral standing but at affirming and reinforcing one’s own commitment to this fact.” On this view, blame can protest by “affirming the protester’s own sense of self worth”(Talbert 2012: 106)—or, as Smith might put it, by communicating to oneself that one has been wronged.

This is one way to make intelligible what inner protest can be. But I think there is a more effective way, not yet proposed by defenders of the Protest View. If blame is communicative, then it is natural to think that, when we blame others, our blame is in some way directed at communicating with others. At the same time, blaming seems to be in some important way a mental activity. I think we can see how even inner protest has both of these features. Inner protest can be a communicative entity directed at others, *and* a mental activity, without being an activity of communicating.

Consider an analogy with defiance.[[9]](#footnote-9) Reactions of defiance are often observable communicative acts, like telling an authority figure to go to hell. But there is also such a thing as a defiant attitude. This attitude is likely to be a complex mix of emotions, intentions, dispositions, expectations, and desires. A teenager faced with a curfew can have a defiant attitude even before the curfew hour comes, by feeling confident, intending to break the curfew, expecting to be caught and to boldly accept punishment, and, among other things, having a desire or disposition to communicate her defiance. What exactly a defiant attitude involves is a complex question. But it is clear enough that, although defiance tends toward outward expression, a defiant attitude can in some cases remain unexpressed. Few would say that the notion of unexpressed defiance is deeply unintelligible.

Defiance is an attitude we can recognize. We can see it as a mental activity, in the fairly minimal way Smith describes; it maintains a set of intentions, expectations, and other reactions that together take a stand against a person or claim. We can also see defiance as communicative, in the way Macnamara describes. It can represent a curfew as wrongfully imposed, and have the function of communicating this representation to the relevant authorities. It is, in that sense, a message, ready to be sent. The message takes the form of the intentions, expectations, and other responses in which the defiance consists. Defiance can thus be both an activity and a message, though it need not always communicate the message.

The Protest View can be understood as having in mind this kind of attitude. The attitude may not be exactly the same; ‘defiance’ can connote a greater degree of aggression or arrogance than some protesters would readily adopt.[[10]](#footnote-10) But an otherwise defiance-like ‘inner protest’ should be as intelligible as an unexpressed attitude of defiance. Though it may tend to work toward its own expression, there is nothing incoherent in imagining it to be held privately. Nor does Smith need to add the caveat: “if only to the victim herself.” Inner protest can always aim at communication with others, even if the aim is not always achieved.[[11]](#footnote-11)

It takes some work to understand the Protest View. But the view is not unintelligible. I turn now to asking whether it is true.

**II. Blame without Protest**

Can a Protest View offer an adequate conception of the nature of blame? In answering this question, we will need to ask whether the notion of protest “unites *all* of the behavioral and attitudinal responses we are inclined to categorize as blame”(Smith 2013: 29, emphasis added). We will also need to ask whether the “element of moral protest”(Smith 2013: 38) captures what is distinctive of blame, rather than still leaving “something missing”(Smith 2013: 27) that is central to blame, as Smith believes Sher’s and Scanlon’s views do. And we will need to assess the prospects both of Smith’s version of the Protest View, and of the Protest View more generally. I will soon turn to Smith’s characterizations of protest, and to cases of protest without blame. But we can begin by asking whether, in the ordinary sense of ‘protest’, we can blame without protesting.

Here the Protest View faces a challenge, even when blame is outwardly expressed. Consider a case of contemptful blame. Receiving a late rent check, a landlord might scoff in contemptful anger and say to her tenant: “As usual. I knew you’d let me down! Even basic decency is too much for you.” This reaction is focused on the renter’s failure to fulfill an obligation, and it is not unnatural to call it “blame”. But the landlord’s contemptful blame carries no expectation of better behavior, and no demand or call for change. It thus does not seem as naturally called a protest. Instead of protest, its function, and the point of its expression, might be to assert superiority, or simply to hurt the tenant’s feelings. We might wonder how such blame can be accommodated by a Protest View.

Here one might object that contempt is compatible with protest. As Bell (2013) nicely brings out, contempt can itself serve as protest, especially when it is a counter-contempt directed at improper contempt or arrogance. In Bell’s main example, contempt in response to racism can be an important way to protest racism. I think this is both true and important. Still, it is one kind of contempt, and does not show that protest is characteristic of contempt in general. The racist contempt of many white slaveowners is one extreme case of contempt without protest. The landlord’s contemptful blame seems to be another, less extreme case.

One might instead object that the landlord’s reaction is *neither* blame nor protest. Blame, one might object, holds its target to a standard, while the landlord does not. This thought has some appeal. But what does ‘holding’ mean here? The sense in which blame ‘holds’ its target to a standard is part of what is at issue. If ‘holding’ means ‘protesting’, the objection is in danger of begging the question. Moreover, as Smith rightly acknowledges, the examples we commonly recognize as blame include blame of strangers and the dead. There is no immediately clear sense of ‘holding’ to a standard that applies to these commonly recognized cases of blame and does not apply to the landlord. The landlord’s emotionally charged reaction to the violation of an obligation displays paradigmatic features of blame, and presents at least an initial challenge to the Protest View.

Some cases of unexpressed blame can also present a challenge. Imagine that someone sees her favorite sports team insulted by a usually considerate friend on social media. Instead of confronting her friend, she withdraws. She “unfriends” her friend, and cuts off interaction with him. She never explains why, and does not intend to, either to him or to anyone else—though she still feels offended whenever she thinks of the insult. It seems hard to deny that this woman blames her former friend.[[12]](#footnote-12) But does she have any recognizable attitude of protest? She seems to have no interest in interacting with her former friend at all.

This kind of ‘unfriending’ can be usefully compared to a boycott. Both involve a kind of cutting off of interaction with their target. When we boycott a company, we might refuse to buy its goods, air or read its ads, or even accept its phone calls. Such boycotts are clearly a kind of protest. Might unfriending not be a kind of protest too? Here, the differences are significant. First, boycotting a company is typically a way of sending a message *to the company*. Boycotts typically seek a particular set of changes in their targets’ practices. They are temporary and conditional, with the conditions explicitly communicated to their target or at least implicitly understood. Boycotting with no explanation would be odd, and hard to see as a boycott. Second, boycotts typically seek to engage a broader public that they hope will join, approve, or at least understand the boycott. In Smith’s terms, boycotts seek moral acknowledgement on the part of both the perceived wrongdoer and the moral community. This is why they are paradigmatic forms of protest. Our imagined unfriender seeks neither kind of acknowledgment. She just withdraws, offended, issuing no challenge or call for change. Although her negative reaction to the insult is naturally seen as blame, it is much less obvious how it might be a kind of protest. An attitude of inner protest may be intelligible, but it is not clearly present in this case.

Smith’s Moral Protest Account offers a way to address these cases of contemptful and unexpressed blame. On her view, blame protests a claim, not a person.[[13]](#footnote-13) This protest can take various forms, including resentment or indignation, which “are ways of emotionally protesting the ill treatment of oneself or others”(2013: 44). On this way of understanding protest, examples such as the landlord and the unfriender are easier to accommodate. When the landlord says “Even basic decency is too much for you,” she implies that the tenant’s conduct violates a norm of moral decency. She can then still be seen as challenging a moral claim implicit in the late rent payment—the claim, for example, that being a few days late is normal and therefore permissible. Similarly, the unfriender’s “feeling offended” is likely an emotion of resentment or indignation, which Smith would consider an emotional form of challenge or protest. Both of these examples can then be understood as including moral protest in Smith’s sense. They may be counterexamples to a Protest View that uses the notion of protest in the ordinary sense. But they are not very effective counterexamples to a Protest View that characterizes protest in the way Smith does.

As this response illustrates, the Protest View has a range of possibilities in responding to examples of blame. These responses can invoke a narrower notion of protest, or a much broader one. A narrow sense of ‘protest’ might encompass outward acts of demanding change, and—to include unexpressed blame—some unexpressed attitudes of inner protest. A broader notion of protest, like Smith’s, might also include emotional reactions such as resentment or indignation, and reactions that do not challenge, or seek acknowledgement by, the person whose implicit moral claim is being protested. A Protest View can have less or more in mind under the heading of ‘protest’.

A Protest View that uses the term ‘protest’ more narrowly will face counterexamples, such as the contemptful landlord and the offended unfriender, which it does not easily accommodate. These counterexamples can help motivate a turn to a broader notion of protest, such as Smith’s. In *her* sense of ‘protest’, there may not be any blame without protest. But this advantage comes at a high cost. Three new difficulties are especially worth mentioning.

First, a broader notion of ‘protest’ like Smith’s seems to depart in important ways from the ordinary notion of protest. We might not be prepared to call something a protest if it seeks acknowledgment only by a broader community, and not by the agent of the conduct that troubles the protester. Nor is an emotional reaction like indignation clearly a protest, taken by itself. More generally, any new, stipulated use of ‘protest’ threatens to undermine the Protest View, if we conclude only that blame is ‘protest’ in the new, stipulated sense. Even if blame is always a kind of ‘protest’, we might say, it might not always be a kind of protest. Stretching the notion of ‘protest’ can make it misleading to say that blame is a kind of protest.

Second, it can be hard to articulate what the broader notion of ‘protest’ amounts to, without appealing to the concept of blame we are trying to illuminate. Departure from the ordinary sense of ‘protest’ raises the problem of specifying a new sense of the word. In what sense is indignation a ‘protest’? What kind of ‘protest’ do blaming reactions have in common? The central sense of ‘protest’ now needs to be explained. And it needs to be explained in a way that does not appeal to our prior intuitive grasp of the concept of blame. As Tognazzini and Coates (2016: §1.4) put it: “It’s not clear that protest is independent of blame, such that one could specify what it is to protest without appealing to blaming attitudes.” That blame is ‘protest’ in a new, broader sense may then be true, but uninformative.

These first two difficulties are significant, but I have no proof that they cannot be addressed. Perhaps a broader notion of protest, still related to the ordinary notion, can be understood independently of the notion of blame. But, once accomplished, this would still leave a third difficulty, which arises directly from the breadth of the central notion of protest. This breadth is likely to leave us with a broader category, such as: challenging a moral claim. The broader category may not yet capture what is distinctive of reactions of blame. There might be, in Smith’s words, something missing.

Smith claims as an advantage that “the moral protest account does not seem to allow ‘false positives’,…in which the basic conditions of blame are met but we are disinclined to classify the resulting reactions as instances of blame”(2013: 46). To put the third difficulty another way: a broader notion of ‘protest’ threatens to reintroduce ‘false positives’, incorrectly characterized as blame. A mother whose son has been convicted of murder might tell him: “Honey, I understand that you’re having a hard time, but this isn’t right—please try to find another way.” Or perhaps: “Honey, I forgive you, but you have to learn from this. You can’t ever do anything like this again.” She might do this with only sadness or pity—two reactions that Smith, at least, describes as “the opposite of blame”(2013: 35). But she would still be registering and challenging a moral claim implicit in her son’s conduct, in a paradigm case of moral protest. If she also judges him to be blameworthy, then, on Smith’s view, she would be blaming him. But there seems to be no reason why she could not admit that he is blameworthy, and encourage him to change, without blaming him herself.

This kind of ‘false positive’ can be resisted in two ways. First, one might doubt that it is a ‘positive’. Would a Protest View have to count the mother’s reaction as blame? For Smith (2013: 43), to blame someone is in part to “modify one own’s attitudes, intentions, and expectations toward that person as a way of *protesting.*” Does the mother modify her attitudes, and does she do so as a way of protesting? I think she does. She certainly modifies her attitudes; sadness and pity are attitudes, and she makes clear that she now expects her son to change. If necessary, we can imagine the mother regretfully announcing a kind of boycott, or unwillingness to support her son financially, until he changes his ways. But I think there is no need to change the example in this way. She already asks her son to change, and, presumably, she does so intentionally. It is already natural to imagine her as having an intention to protest. When she visits him in prison, she may come with the express purpose of challenging his behavior and his attitudes toward others. It is hard to see why Smith’s view would not count her as blaming her son.

Secondly, one might now wonder: is this a *false* positive? Might it not be correct to think of the mother as blaming her son? I think we can easily imagine a variant of this example in which she does. On this variant, she tells herself, and him, that she forgives him, but in fact she does not. But this is a variant. To insist that the mother must be blaming her son is, I think, to treat all moral challenges as cases of blame. Once again, simply *challenging a* *claim* implicit in someone’s conduct—or, more precisely, modifying one’s attitudes as a way of challenging a claim—may not yet be blaming him.[[14]](#footnote-14) A claim can be challenged with sadness, or pity, or even with hope and excitement. We regularly challenge the moral claims implicit in our children’s conduct, but (one hopes) without always blaming them, even when we think they are blameworthy. As parents, teachers, or friends, we can challenge the moral claims of others with almost any kind of attitude, and almost any kind of goal. “Challenging a claim” is a central category at the heart of Smith’s notion of protest; it is also a very broad one. The broader category of challenge does not yet identify what is distinctive about reactions of blame.

These difficulties for the Protest View can be put as a dilemma: either use the ordinary notion of protest, or use a different, broader notion. The first option runs into counterexamples, such as the contemptful landlord or the offended unfriender. The second option is not clearly a Protest View; does not obviously have an independently clear notion of protest; and threatens to allow too many reactions to count as blame. It is hard to see a satisfying response to this dilemma. And without a satisfying response, the dilemma should lead us to doubt the descriptive adequacy of the Protest View.[[15]](#footnote-15)

In fact, I think the prospects of the Protest View are even worse than this dilemma suggests. A broader notion of protest *more clearly* reintroduces ‘false positives’, or incorrect attributions of blame, into the Protest View. But I think there is an important category of false positives even with a narrower notion of protest. The tradition of nonviolent resistance is itself a powerful ‘false positive’. That tradition suggests that protest is not the heart of blame, but, at most, a much broader category that includes some cases of blame. I turn now to these other cases of protest without blame.

**III. Protest without Blame**

The tradition of nonviolent resistance is clearly a tradition of moral protest. As Gandhi (1956: 219) put it, “Non-cooperation is a protest against an unwitting and unwilling participation in evil.” But it is hard to see room for blame in such protest. In Gandhi’s ideal of *satyagraha*, or soul-force, good will predominates (1957: 437): “Experience has taught me that civility is the most difficult part of Satyagraha. Civility does not here mean the mere outward gentleness of speech cultivated for the occasion, but an inborn gentleness and desire to do the opponent good. These should show themselves in every act of a Satyagrahi.” More to the point in a discussion of blame, Dr. King insisted that “Forgiveness is not an occasional act; it is a permanent attitude”(2010b: 33). For him, “It is impossible even to begin the act of loving one’s enemies without the prior acceptance of the necessity, over and over again, of forgiving those who inflict evil and injury upon us”(2010b: 44).

Dr. King may have overstated part of his thought. It might be possible to love without forgiveness. But he and Gandhi shared a vision of a protest movement in which love, forgiveness, and good will are not only present, but dominant. Dr. King incorporated this dominance into his statements of the central characteristics of nonviolent resistance. In an account of the Montgomery bus boycotts, he writes (2010a: 90-93):

First, it must be emphasized that nonviolent resistance is not a method for cowards; it does resist…. A second basic fact that characterizes nonviolence is that it does not seek to defeat or humiliate the opponent, but to win his friendship and understanding…. A third characteristic of this method is that the attack is directed against forces of evil rather than against persons who happen to be doing the evil…As I like to say to the people in Montgomery: ‘The tension in this city is not between white people and Negro people. The tension is, at bottom, between justice and injustice…. A fourth point that characterizes nonviolent resistance is a willingness to accept suffering without retaliation…. A fifth point concerning nonviolent resistance is that it avoids not only external physical violence but also internal violence of spirit. The nonviolent resister not only refuses to shoot his opponent but he also refuses to hate him. At the center of nonviolence stands the principle of love…. When we speak of loving those who oppose us, we refer to neither *eros* nor *philia*; we speak of a love which is expressed in the Greek word *agape*. *Agape* means understanding, redeeming goodwill for all men. It is an overflowing love which is purely spontaneous, unmotivated, groundless, and creative. It is not set in motion by any quality or function of its object…. *Agape* does not begin by discriminating between worthy and unworthy people, or any qualities people possess.

As Dr. King’s first characteristic reminds us, the boycotts and sit-ins of the civil rights era were genuine protests. His third characteristic sets a target closely related to Smith’s: not a person, but a force of evil or injustice—the kind of force that carries a moral claim that calls out to be challenged. Dr. King’s fourth point adds little in this context, since one can blame without retaliating. But the second and fifth speak volumes. Like Gandhi, Dr. King certainly thought that dominant whites had attitudes that impaired their relations with others; so, at least in the sense specified by Smith’s Moral Protest Account, he judged whites blameworthy. But his aim was to establish friendship and understanding through an overflowing love, *agape*, which left little room for blame. The earlier quoted passage about the necessity of forgiving is explicit on this point. And Dr. King was explicit that forgiving was not forgetting or condoning injustice. Nonviolent resistance “does resist.” This seems to be a clear example of moral protest without blame.

In *Strength to Love*, Dr. King wrote (2010b: 45):

Forgiveness does not mean ignoring what has been done or putting a false label on an evil act. It means, rather, that the evil act no longer remains as a barrier to the relationship. Forgiveness is a catalyst creating the atmosphere necessary for a fresh start and a new beginning….When we forgive, we forget in the sense that the evil deed is no longer a mental block impeding a relationship.

In the context of a protest, this forgiveness offers a different way to challenge a claim. The claims implicit in, for example, expecting African-American bus passengers to give up their seat to whites, were certainly challenged by nonviolent resistance. The challenge was forceful and clear.

In the case of nonviolent protesters, it is especially hard to believe that they do not modify their attitudes, or do not modify them as a way of protesting. They modify their attitudes in specific ways, often difficult and requiring training. The passages from Dr. King emphasize courage, goodwill, love, refusal to hate, avoidance of violence, “willingness to accept suffering without retaliation,” and forgiveness itself as attitudes taken up by nonviolent resisters in their particular way of protesting. These attitudes are crucial. As Gandhi knew, violent protests of comparable size rarely succeeded in moving the British government, and even when they did, they left rankling hostility rather than the “friendship and understanding” Dr. King describes nonviolent resistance as seeking. The attitudes of nonviolent protest are essential to its aims and methods.

On the other hand, a challenge in the spirit of forgiving love is a distinct kind of challenge, with few of the characteristics we associate with blame. It is not centered on emotions such as resentment, anger, or indignation, or even on fault. It does not brood, retaliate, or punish. It aims explicitly at forgiveness and good will. Once again, this does not seem to embody anything like blame.

The element of protest, or of challenge to a moral claim, can be embodied in an activist’s writing: “Please, do not do this, it is wrong,” or a citizen’s staying in her seat on a segregated bus, just as it can be in a mother’s saying: “Honey, stop.” Moral protest is a practice we can engage in without blame, and vice versa. If this is right, moral protest at most overlaps with blame, as two related reactions to wrongdoing. Or if we take ‘protest’ in Smith’s broader sense, we can instead say: there are many ways to protest, and blame is only one of them. In either case, the notion of protest does not capture what is distinctive about blame.

These differences between blame and protest have important implications about the value of blame. Franklin (2013: 223) argues that “it is blame’s constitutive connection to value that makes it good and right, for if we fail to blame when blame is appropriate…, we fail to value what we ought to value.” After all, Franklin asks, “can we really value, for example, persons and yet not be disposed whatsoever to blame those who wantonly disvalue them? Or fail to see any reason whatsoever to rebuke these blameworthy agents?”(2013: 221) For Franklin, blame’s role in protesting wrongs is a central way in which we value what we value, and is central to the importance of blame. Indeed, on his view “blame is *essential* to valuing what we ought to value”(2013: 209). Though Frankin does not defend a Protest View, the Protest View offers a way to defend his view of the value of blame. If protest is essential to valuing what we ought to value, and blame is a kind of protest, blame, too, can seem essential.

Can there be other proper ways of valuing what we ought to value? Franklin considers and rejects one alternative: sadness. On his view, “sadness does not have the dimension of condemnation required for defending and protecting moral values”(2013: 221).[[16]](#footnote-16) Nonviolent resistance offers a different alternative, which Franklin does not consider. For many nonviolent resisters, it is crucial to distinguish different kinds of protest, and to see protest without blame as a reaction that can be forceful and effective. Protest without blame may not exactly be “condemnation”. But it does have the dimension of challenge, or resistance, required for defending moral values. As Gandhi and Dr. King helped us see, it is a central way in which we fight for what we believe is right.

When Franklin asks: “can we really value, for example, persons and yet not be disposed whatsoever to blame those who wantonly disvalue them?”(2013: 221), we can imagine Gandhi and Dr. King saying, “Yes, we can.” We can also imagine them wondering why someone would ask this question. Valuing without blaming seems impossible, or paradoxical, if we see blaming as the *only* response to wrongdoing that still values persons. As nonviolent resisters remind us, this is a dangerously narrow picture of our range of options. It is a picture that can easily grip us. And the Protest View can reinforce that grip. When it leads us to ignore the differences between kinds of moral protest, the Protest View obscures the possibility of protesting without blame. Like Franklin, those who accept a Protest View can have difficulty recognizing non-blaming protest as even one option.

But it is an option, and it can be a good one. Recalling the difficulties for the Protest View can help us say why protest can be a better alternative to blame, in a way that sadness alone may not be.

First, cases of unexpressed or contemptful blame often differ from protest in their *failure* to actively hold a wrongdoer to a standard. Even if inner protest is possible, protest is paradigmatically interactive and collective. For those inclined to protest, inner protest is a last resort. An aim of replacing blame with protest will tend to push us away from reactions such as private or contemptful blame, toward bolder and more public resistance to injustices and other wrongs.

Second, cases of protest without blame remind us of the importance of protesting with love. It is tempting to describe blame in a way that makes it look relatively innocent. Houston (1992: 137) writes, for example: “Blame, along with the other responsive participant attitudes, is the expression of our expectation of another’s good will.” But blame can be notoriously angry, hateful, and vengeful.[[17]](#footnote-17) Protesting without blame can help us avoid the more venomous tendencies of blame, when that is appropriate. Here again, when we see that blaming and protesting reactions differ, the differences can in many cases recommend protest without blame.

I think there is a more general lesson to be learned here. Defenses of blame can claim many things: that blame protests wrongs, defends values, expresses an expectation of good will, shows anger, scares wrongdoers (Reis-Dennis, forthcoming), or serves as an “expensive signal” (McGeer 2013: 182), showing how much we care about the standards that have been violated. Even if we grant that all of these features are desirable, an advocate of nonviolent resistance can make the same response to all of these defenses. The response is: “There is a better way to do that.” This is a powerful response, which presents a genuine alternative. One can say: “Stop! That is not okay!”, and in some cases, put one’s own life on the line, protesting forcefully while maintaining a forgiving attitude. Advocates of blame bear the burden of saying why blaming is the best way to make the response they describe. A failure to offer such an explanation helps to highlight the appeal of nonviolent resistance as an alternative to blame.

At this point one might wonder what, if anything, is of value in the Protest View. I think it is still true, and significant, that *some* instances of blame are instances of protest. This is a genuine insight that may help explain some blaming reactions, and shed light on some of blame’s characteristic features. It may help us understand, for example, the role a broader community can play as a secondary addressee of some blaming reactions. If it is true that blaming reactions can be either emotional or dispassionate, the connection to protest might help explain this truth. On the other hand, the explanatory power of the insight is limited. It abandons the Protest View’s larger ambition to show that the notion of protest is what “unites all of the behavioral and attitudinal responses we are inclined to categorize as blame”(Smith 2013: 29). It leaves non-protesting blame unexplored. Even in cases of protesting blame, it leaves open whether a particular feature of some blaming reaction is explained by the element of protest, or by something else. In practice, it leaves open the possibility that in any particular blaming protest, the protest is appropriate, but the blaming is not. It is a bit like the insight that some blaming reactions are angry. This insight, too, is significant, and helps us think clearly about blame. But it has little in common with an Anger View, on which the notion of anger unites all the behavioral and attitudinal responses we are inclined to characterize as blame. That view, many think, is an overgeneralization that distorts our picture both of the nature of blame, and of its value or disvalue. The same can be said about the Protest View. Blame’s connection to protest is important, and worth exploring. But the Protest View is, I suggest, a distorting overgeneralization, harmful to the aims of both theory and justice.

In saying this, I have not offered a descriptive conception of blame; I leave that for another time. I have tried, instead, to defend the spirit of nonviolent resistance against the grouping of blame reactions under the category of protest. That grouping can invite the conflation of blame’s tendencies to anger, hatred, revenge, withdrawal, and contempt with the forcefulness characteristic of many nonviolent movements. The confusion obscures an alternative—other than sadness—that those who follow Gandhi or Dr. King see as crucial. These protesters are not failing to value what they ought to value, or failing to challenge violations of morality’s standards. They are, in many cases, registering and challenging those violations while refusing to blame them.

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1. Gandhi (1993, 2001) and King (2003, 2010a, 2010b) are good starting points among these writings. Helpful secondary sources include Iyer (1973), Nanda (1985), Moses (1997), Shelby and Terry (2018), and, among writings on blame, the concluding paragraphs of Watson (1987). I assume in the text that forgiveness renounces blame. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. I will use “blame” to refer to specifically moral blame, as opposed to the more minimal or causal blame we exhibit in blaming bad brakes for a car crash. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Hieronymi (2001) offers a conception of resentment, though she does not explicitly identify resentment with blame. For her, “resentment…should be understood as protest…. Resentment protests a past action that persists as a present threat”(530: 546). Pereboom endorses a “leaner” variant of Smith’s view, which he calls “Moral Protest Account of Blame: For B to blame A is for B to issue a moral protest against A for what B represents (either truly or falsely) as A’s immoral conduct”(2017: 129). Pereboom (2017: 129) also writes that “McKenna’s [2012] conversational account of blame might also be recast as a moral protest account.” Talbert suggests a qualified Protest View, which I discuss briefly in §I. Several other writers describe blame in terms of the related notion of a ‘demand’; for discussion, see Macnamara (2013b). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Smith’s characterization of judgments of blameworthiness in terms of impaired relationships is borrowed from Scanlon, and not essential to a Protest View. It is dropped by Pereboom (2017: 129) in his modified version of Smith’s view. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. For the view that blame is at least implicitly communicative, see Darwall (2006, esp. Ch.4), Macnamara (2013a, 2015a, 2015b), McKenna (2012, 2013), Shoemaker (2007), Walker (2006), Wallace (1994), and Watson (1987). For an influential dissenting view, see Scanlon (2008: 233n54), for whom “blame…is not, even incipiently, a form of communication.” [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Smith sees this as an advantage especially in comparison with Sher (2006), for whom, she writes, such sadness would count as blame; see Smith (2013: 35). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Conceptions of blame that emphasize emotion are influenced especially by Strawson (1962); for recent examples, see Wallace (1994, 2011), Wolf (2011), Bell (2013), and Tognazzini (2013). Scanlon and Smith include both emotions and other attitudes as blaming reactions. Some views, typically utilitarian and no longer popular, have thought of blame as an action after all; but these views are often thought to confuse blame with the expression of blame. For discussion, see Sher (2006: 71-74). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. For a critical discussion of Smith’s invocation of a wider moral community as protest’s secondary target, see Macnamara (2015b: 223-8). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Talbert (2012: 106) briefly mentions outward defiance in his discussion of Duboisian protest: “to the extent that it communicates with the oppressor, it is not an invitation to dialogue so much as a defiant declaration.” But he does not consider the unexpressed attitude of ‘inner’ defiance to which I want to draw an analogy. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. In Murphy and Hampton (1988: 57), Jean Hampton writes that an “act of defiance is the heart of the emotion of resentment.” This is a somewhat different thought from the thought that *protest* is the heart of resentment. I doubt it captures the more brooding and victimized forms of resentment; but I do not argue this in detail here, since my topic is protest.

    For discussion of cases in which outward protest seems to lose its point, see Hill (1979) and Bommarito (2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. One might still communicate only with oneself in cases of self-blame. And one might wonder how the Protest View accommodates self-blame. I leave this other kind of counterexample aside, to focus on the difficulties that arise even in cases of blaming others.

    One might also ask: in unexpressed protest, what is the message that is not expressed? A Protest View can be developed in part by answering this question. For Smith, the message may be anything that challenges a moral claim, either explicitly or implicitly. A different Protest View may have a narrower conception of the message blame aims to communicate. Though added detail would be helpful here, I leave this issue aside, since it does not threaten the basic coherence of the notion of protest, and answering it does not remove the doubts I go on to raise about descriptive adequacy. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Smith (2013: 32) briefly mentions “dispassionately ‘unfriending’ someone on one’s Facebook page” as a difficult case for emotion-centered views of blame, and suggests that it “should qualify as…blame.” I have added emotion to the example, to make it an even less controversial example of blame. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Although I go on to focus on the breadth of Smith’s notion of protest, her exclusion of protesting a person also makes her notion of protest in one way narrower than the ordinary one. In this respect her view parallels Hieronymi’s, but not Pereboom’s; see note 3 above, and note 15 below. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. She might even say: “Honey, I don’t blame you, but you have to stop.” The Moorean oddity of such statements presents an additional puzzle for the Protest View, which I will leave aside here. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. The dilemma can also be raised for views like that in Pereboom (2017), which endorses a Protest View on which the primary target of protest is behavior rather than a claim (see note 3 above). If this view is understood as including *both* protests against behavior and protests against a claim, it is a fairly broad view, perhaps broader than Smith’s. If it is understood in a narrower way, as protesting only behavior or dispositions to act in certain ways, it faces counterexamples such as my landlord and offended friend, neither of which seem to be protesting behavior. In the case of Hieronymi’s view that “resentment…should be understood as protest”(2001: 530), a variant of the dilemma arises. For Hieronymi, “resentment protests a past action that persists as a present threat”(546). This “resentment is grounded…on a…judgment…that the [resented] event makes a threatening claim”(552). In what way does resentment go beyond making the judgment on which it is grounded? In the narrower, ordinary sense or ‘protest’, a contemptful landlord or offended unfriender seem able to resent without protesting. A ‘protest’ in a broader sense might do little, if anything, beyond affirming the judgment that an event makes a threatening claim. This makes it more believable that all resentment does protest, but less believable that Hieronymi has described the distinctive reaction of resentment. We can recognize and actively protest a threatening claim without resenting it, and some nonviolent resisters do just that. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. For a defense of sadness as an alternative to blame, see Menges (2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. On the importance of emotions such as anger in blame, see, for example, Wallace (1994, 2011), Wolf (2011), and Nussbaum (2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-17)