Research
Selected Papers
(Click the paper title to access the paper.)
"A Solution for Buridan's Ass" (Ethics, January 2016)
Abstract: Buridan’s Ass faced a choice between two identical bales of hay; governed only by reason, the donkey starved, unable to choose. It seems clear that we face many such cases, and resolve them successfully. Our success seems to tell against any view on which action and intention require evaluative preference. I argue that these views can account for intention and intentional action in cases like that of Buridan’s Ass. A decision to act nonintentionally allows us to resolve these cases without their being a damaging theoretical counterexample.
"Moore's Paradox and Akratic Belief" (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, May 2016; published version here -- access required)
Abstract: G.E. Moore noticed the oddity of statements like: “It’s raining, but I don’t believe it.” This oddity is often seen as analogous to the oddity of believing akratically, or believing what one believes one should not believe. It has been appealed to in denying the possibility of akratic belief. I describe a Belief Akratic’s Paradox, analogous to Moore’s Paradox and centered on sentences such as: “I believe it’s raining, but I shouldn’t believe it.” I then defend the possibility of akratic belief against appeals to this analogy. I argue both that akratic belief does not require belief-akratic-paradoxical belief, and that the latter is importantly different from Moorean belief. I conclude by considering the implications of these arguments for an understanding of both Moorean and akratic belief.
"Blame and Protest" (The Journal of Ethics, June 2019; published version here -- access required)
In recent years, philosophers have developed a novel conception of blame as a kind of moral protest. This view faces doubts about its intelligibility: can we make sense of inner ‘protest’ in cases of unexpressed blame? It also faces doubts about its descriptive adequacy: are all blaming reactions cases of protest? I argue that the protest view of blame can successfully answer the first kind of doubt, but not the second. Contemptful or unexpressed blame may not be protest, just as ‘nonviolent’ protest can avoid blame. I then defend an alternative view of the connection between protest and blame, characteristic of nonviolent resistance. On that alternative, the connection is not descriptive but practical; rather than understanding blame as a kind of protest, we should aim, in many cases, to replace blame with protest.
"Scanlon's Theories of Blame" (forthcoming in The Journal of Value Inquiry; published-online version here -- access required)
T.M. Scanlon has recently offered an influential treatment of blame as a response to the impairment of a relationship. I argue, first, that Scanlon’s remarks about the nature of blame suggest several sharply diverging views, so different that they can reasonably be considered different theories: a judgment-centered theory, on which blame is the reaction the blamer judges appropriate; an appropriateness-centered theory, on which blame is any reaction that is actually appropriate; and a substantive list theory, on which blame is any of a list of reactions, such as anger or loss of trust. Once distinguished, each theory faces a series of formidable challenges that neither Scanlon nor his commentators have addressed. I argue that the notion of directed attention, central in Scanlon’s earlier work, can be used to address these challenges, while preserving the spirit of Scanlon’s discussion of blame.
"A Solution for Buridan's Ass" (Ethics, January 2016)
Abstract: Buridan’s Ass faced a choice between two identical bales of hay; governed only by reason, the donkey starved, unable to choose. It seems clear that we face many such cases, and resolve them successfully. Our success seems to tell against any view on which action and intention require evaluative preference. I argue that these views can account for intention and intentional action in cases like that of Buridan’s Ass. A decision to act nonintentionally allows us to resolve these cases without their being a damaging theoretical counterexample.
"Moore's Paradox and Akratic Belief" (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, May 2016; published version here -- access required)
Abstract: G.E. Moore noticed the oddity of statements like: “It’s raining, but I don’t believe it.” This oddity is often seen as analogous to the oddity of believing akratically, or believing what one believes one should not believe. It has been appealed to in denying the possibility of akratic belief. I describe a Belief Akratic’s Paradox, analogous to Moore’s Paradox and centered on sentences such as: “I believe it’s raining, but I shouldn’t believe it.” I then defend the possibility of akratic belief against appeals to this analogy. I argue both that akratic belief does not require belief-akratic-paradoxical belief, and that the latter is importantly different from Moorean belief. I conclude by considering the implications of these arguments for an understanding of both Moorean and akratic belief.
"Blame and Protest" (The Journal of Ethics, June 2019; published version here -- access required)
In recent years, philosophers have developed a novel conception of blame as a kind of moral protest. This view faces doubts about its intelligibility: can we make sense of inner ‘protest’ in cases of unexpressed blame? It also faces doubts about its descriptive adequacy: are all blaming reactions cases of protest? I argue that the protest view of blame can successfully answer the first kind of doubt, but not the second. Contemptful or unexpressed blame may not be protest, just as ‘nonviolent’ protest can avoid blame. I then defend an alternative view of the connection between protest and blame, characteristic of nonviolent resistance. On that alternative, the connection is not descriptive but practical; rather than understanding blame as a kind of protest, we should aim, in many cases, to replace blame with protest.
"Scanlon's Theories of Blame" (forthcoming in The Journal of Value Inquiry; published-online version here -- access required)
T.M. Scanlon has recently offered an influential treatment of blame as a response to the impairment of a relationship. I argue, first, that Scanlon’s remarks about the nature of blame suggest several sharply diverging views, so different that they can reasonably be considered different theories: a judgment-centered theory, on which blame is the reaction the blamer judges appropriate; an appropriateness-centered theory, on which blame is any reaction that is actually appropriate; and a substantive list theory, on which blame is any of a list of reactions, such as anger or loss of trust. Once distinguished, each theory faces a series of formidable challenges that neither Scanlon nor his commentators have addressed. I argue that the notion of directed attention, central in Scanlon’s earlier work, can be used to address these challenges, while preserving the spirit of Scanlon’s discussion of blame.
Dissertation: Intention and Normative Belief
My dissertation defended the view that we act "under the guise of the good." More specifically, I argued that a person cannot intend to do something without believing she ought to do it. I tried to show how conflicts in intention and belief, as well as more complex impairments in these states, can account for the central problem cases: akrasia in belief and intention, apparently unintelligible choices, and accidie.
