Research
Selected Papers
(Click the paper title to access the paper.)
"A Solution for Buridan's Ass" (Ethics, January 2016)
Abstract: Buridan’s Ass faced a choice between two identical bales of hay; governed only by reason, the donkey starved, unable to choose. It seems clear that we face many such cases, and resolve them successfully. Our success seems to tell against any view on which action and intention require evaluative preference. I argue that these views can account for intention and intentional action in cases like that of Buridan’s Ass. A decision to act nonintentionally allows us to resolve these cases without their being a damaging theoretical counterexample.
"Moore's Paradox and Akratic Belief" (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, May 2016; published version here -- access required)
Abstract: G.E. Moore noticed the oddity of statements like: “It’s raining, but I don’t believe it.” This oddity is often seen as analogous to the oddity of believing akratically, or believing what one believes one should not believe. It has been appealed to in denying the possibility of akratic belief. I describe a Belief Akratic’s Paradox, analogous to Moore’s Paradox and centered on sentences such as: “I believe it’s raining, but I shouldn’t believe it.” I then defend the possibility of akratic belief against appeals to this analogy. I argue both that akratic belief does not require belief-akratic-paradoxical belief, and that the latter is importantly different from Moorean belief. I conclude by considering the implications of these arguments for an understanding of both Moorean and akratic belief.
"Akratic Action under the Guise of the Good" (under review)
Abstract: I defend a strong version of the view that we act “under the guise of the good,” on which all intentional action requires belief that one ought to perform the action. My focus is on the central counterexample of akratic action, or intentional action that one believes one ought not perform. I use a criticism of Davidson’s view of akrasia to raise the possibility of appealing to conflicting beliefs: a belief that one ought to do something, and a belief that one ought not. I then answer concerns that this appeal is insufficiently explanatory, attributes too much contradiction, attributes mistakes about one’s own beliefs, and leaves out an essential asymmetry in action against one’s ‘better’ judgment. On the contrary, appealing to conflicting beliefs reduces one problem to another, helps explain why akratic action is puzzling, attributes a small but plausible amount of error in self-attribution, and leaves room for various forms of asymmetry.
"A Solution for Buridan's Ass" (Ethics, January 2016)
Abstract: Buridan’s Ass faced a choice between two identical bales of hay; governed only by reason, the donkey starved, unable to choose. It seems clear that we face many such cases, and resolve them successfully. Our success seems to tell against any view on which action and intention require evaluative preference. I argue that these views can account for intention and intentional action in cases like that of Buridan’s Ass. A decision to act nonintentionally allows us to resolve these cases without their being a damaging theoretical counterexample.
"Moore's Paradox and Akratic Belief" (Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, May 2016; published version here -- access required)
Abstract: G.E. Moore noticed the oddity of statements like: “It’s raining, but I don’t believe it.” This oddity is often seen as analogous to the oddity of believing akratically, or believing what one believes one should not believe. It has been appealed to in denying the possibility of akratic belief. I describe a Belief Akratic’s Paradox, analogous to Moore’s Paradox and centered on sentences such as: “I believe it’s raining, but I shouldn’t believe it.” I then defend the possibility of akratic belief against appeals to this analogy. I argue both that akratic belief does not require belief-akratic-paradoxical belief, and that the latter is importantly different from Moorean belief. I conclude by considering the implications of these arguments for an understanding of both Moorean and akratic belief.
"Akratic Action under the Guise of the Good" (under review)
Abstract: I defend a strong version of the view that we act “under the guise of the good,” on which all intentional action requires belief that one ought to perform the action. My focus is on the central counterexample of akratic action, or intentional action that one believes one ought not perform. I use a criticism of Davidson’s view of akrasia to raise the possibility of appealing to conflicting beliefs: a belief that one ought to do something, and a belief that one ought not. I then answer concerns that this appeal is insufficiently explanatory, attributes too much contradiction, attributes mistakes about one’s own beliefs, and leaves out an essential asymmetry in action against one’s ‘better’ judgment. On the contrary, appealing to conflicting beliefs reduces one problem to another, helps explain why akratic action is puzzling, attributes a small but plausible amount of error in self-attribution, and leaves room for various forms of asymmetry.
Dissertation: Intention and Normative Belief
My dissertation defended the view that we act "under the guise of the good." More specifically, I argued that we cannot intend to do something without believing we ought to do it. I tried to show how conflicts in intention and belief, as well as more complex impairments in these states, can account for the central problem cases: akrasia in belief and intention, apparently unintelligible choices, and accidie.